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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is on the march. Mandatory arbitration 
agreements have become a common feature in employment, as a 
Vox article noted: “Millions of American workers have given up 
their right to go to court just to earn a paycheck. They can’t sue 
their employer for sexual harassment, or for racial 
discrimination, or for stealing their wages, or for nearly 
anything else.”1
As the article pointed out, this even has the potential to 
thwart the #MeToo movement: “Women are coming forward, 
often for the first time, with stories of widespread sexual 
harassment at work, only to discover that they’ve been shut out 
of the court system because they signed an arbitration 
agreement.”2
This trend is concerning.  As Stephen Stachowski, has 
written: 
One of the key, if not predominant, purposes of arbitration is to 
serve as an effective and efficient form of alternative dispute 
resolution.  In the world of capitalism such a purpose may even be 
considered a virtue.  However, this purpose may be especially 
disheartening because in its pursuit of efficiency arbitration leaves 
behind another virtue: justice.3
Surely we might agree that there are employment 
1. Alexia Fernández Campbel & Alvin Chang, There’s a Good Chance You’ve Waived 
the Right to Sue Your Boss, VOX (Sep. 7, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/8/1/16992362/sexual-harassment-mandatory-arbitration 
2. Id.  Among those affected was former Fox News anchor Gretchen Carlson: 
She ended up suing Roger Ailes for sexual 
harassment, and they settled for an 
undisclosed amount. But Carlson could not 
sue Fox News for the company’s role in 
allowing the sexual harassment to persist, 
and neither could dozens of other women who 
accused the media company of tolerating 
sexual harassment, had they decided they 
wanted to sue.   
Id.
3. Stephen Stachowski, Arbitration’s Use of Experts Hinders Justice, ARB. L. REV.
BLOG (Dec. 26, 2017) (emphasis added), 
https://sites.psu.edu/arbitrationlawreview/2017/12/26/arbitrations-use-of-experts-
hinders-justice/. 
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situations in which complainants should have access to the 
courtroom.  While sexual harassment is a sympathetic reason, 
and has precipitated congressional legislation described later in 
this piece, what of wage theft?  Wage theft is surely as injurious, 
and can often disproportionately affect women – particularly in 
the service economy.4 And what of racial discrimination – 
especially at a time when immigrants are being targeted for 
deportation and may be afraid to interact with those enforcing 
workplace laws?5
As one scholar says of arbitration generally: 
Inasmuch as arbitration doctrine stifles the judiciary’s 
essential role in declaring ‘what the law is,’ so too does it diminish 
the deliberative character of democratic governance that the 
Petition Clause facilitates. It privatizes the once-public dialogue 
between court and litigant, and in turn, shuts the public out of an 
entire branch of government.6
This article first examines the landscape for mandatory 
employment arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act,7 as 
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in its May 2018 decision 
in Epic Systems v. Lewis.8  Has mandatory arbitration become, 
as Professor Cynthia Estlund maintained even before Epic, a 
“black hole into which matter collapses and no light escapes”?9
4. See, e.g, Justice for Nail Salon Workers,  N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/opinion/justice-for-nail-salon-workers.html 
(“Across the country, countless workers in the nail salon industry, mainly immigrant 
women, toil in misery and ill health for meager pay, usually with no overtime, 
abused by employers who show little or no consideration for their safety and well-
being.”) Id.
5. See, e.g., Laura D. Francis, Fear of Immigration Raids May Harm Workplace 
Rights, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.bna.com/fear-immigration-raids-
n57982084586/. (“With the highest rates of wage and hour violations among 
undocumented immigrants—particularly women—employer threats of calls to 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement are ‘very strong,’ Haeyoung Yoon, director of 
strategic partnerships at the National Employment Law Project, said[.]”) Id.
6. See Matthew J. Stanford, Diminution Doctrine: Arbitration’s First Amendment 
Problem, 52 UC DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 73, 93-94 (2018) (emphasis added). 
7. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1990). 
8. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018); see also Nina Tottenberg, 
Supreme Court Decision Delivers Blow To Workers’ Rights, NPR (May 21, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/05/21/605012795/supreme-court-decision-delivers-blow-to-
workers-rights (At stake, though the facts were lacking in the opinion, “[t]he ruling 
came in three cases — potentially involving tens of thousands of nonunion employees 
— brought against Ernst & Young LLP, Epic Systems Corp. and Murphy Oil USA 
Inc.”) 
9. Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679, 
682 (2018).   
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The article then examines some state, and federal, 
legislative efforts to shed some light on at least the employment 
sexual harassment claims that might otherwise disappear into 
the “black hole” that Professor Estlund evocatively describes.10
In its third part, the article takes notice of two Eleventh 
Circuit decisions that suggest even arbitration is not without its 
risks for businesses.11
The article concludes with the author recommending a 
congressional approach, as well as a clever approach taken by 
one state, replicable in others, that would appear to not be 
preempted under the FAA.12
II. EPIC SYSTEMS V. LEWIS
Under the Obama Administration, the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) was curtailing the use of arbitration 
agreements.  As the NLRB has recounted: “The Board first held 
that the maintenance of individual arbitration agreements 
containing class-action waivers violated the Act in 2012.  During 
the six years that this rule was in place, Board decisions 
invalidated arbitration agreements and policies used by many 
employers.”13
As described by the NLRB in 2012: 
The National Labor Relations Board has ruled that it is a 
violation of federal labor law to require employees to sign 
arbitration agreements that prevent them from joining together to 
pursue employment-related legal claims in any forum, whether in 
arbitration or in court. 
The decision examined one such agreement used by 
nationwide homebuilder D.R. Horton, under which employees 
waived their right to a judicial forum and agreed to bring all 
claims to an arbitrator on an individual basis. The agreement 
prohibited the arbitrator from consolidating claims, fashioning a 
class or collective action, or awarding relief to a group or class of 
employees. 
10. See generally, id. 
11. See, infra Part IV. 
12. See, infra Part IV.  
13. Press Release, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, Supreme Court Issues Decision in NLRB 
v. Murphy Oil USA (May 21, 2018), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-
story/supreme-court-issues-decision-nlrb-v-murphy-oil-usa. 
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The Board found that the agreement unlawfully barred 
employees from engaging in “concerted activity” protected by the 
National Labor Relations Act.  The Board emphasized that the 
ruling does not require class arbitration as long as the 
agreement leaves open a judicial forum for group claims.14
Yet the election of President Trump offered a chance to 
sweep away this restriction.  And in Epic the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s newest justice, Neil Gorsuch, again proved his 
conservative bona fides by authoring an opinion, on a 5-4 split, 
that had business groups cheering, effectively ruling that the 
1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) trumps the rights the NLRB 
conferred upon workers through the 1935 National Labor 
Relations Act.15
In Epic, Gorsuch framed the questions at the outset of his 
opinion: “Should employees and employers be allowed to agree 
that any disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-
one arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to 
bring their claims in class or collective actions, no matter what 
they agreed with their employers?”16
Allowing that “[a]s a matter of policy these questions are 
surely debatable,” Gorsuch read the Federal Arbitration Act as 
“a congressional command requiring us to enforce, not override, 
the terms of the arbitration agreements before us.”17 He 
accorded no deference to the NLRB, noting “the Executive has 
disavowed the Board’s (most recent) position[.]”18
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Ginsburg wrote, “[t]he 
inevitable result of today’s decision will be the underenforcement 
of federal and state statutes designed to advance the well-being 
of vulnerable workers.”19 She maintained that “[i]f employers 
can stave off collective employment litigation aimed at obtaining 
redress for wage and hours infractions, the enforcement gap is 
almost certain to widen.”20 And she rejected the majority’s 
14. Press Release, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, Board Finds that Certain Mandatory 
Arbitration Agreements Violate Federal Labor Law (Jan. 6, 2012), 
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-finds-certain-mandatory-
arbitration-agreements-violate-federal-labor. 
15. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1629 (2018) (holding that “the 
Board hasn’t just sought to interpret its statute, the NLRB, in isolation; it has 
sought to interpret this statute in a way that limits the work of a second statute, the 
Arbitration Act. . . . it does not administer”). 
16. Id. at 1619. 
17. Id. at 1623. 
18. Id. at 1621. 
19. Id. at 1646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
20. Id. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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argument that it was simply applying statute: “[T]he edict that 
employees with wage and hours claims may seek relief only one-
by-one does not come from Congress.  It is the result of take-it-
or-leave-it labor contracts harking back to the type called ‘yellow 
dog,’ and of the readiness of this Court to enforce those 
unbargained-for agreements.”21
Ginsburg noted that the FAA has become supersized 
through the Court’s interpretation: “In recent decades, this 
Court has veered away from Congress’ intent simply to afford 
merchants a speedy and economical means of resolving 
commercial disputes.”22
An article in Current Affairs described the case colorfully: 
In April 2014, a Wisconsin healthcare company called Epic 
Systems sent an email to employees. The message contained 1) a 
new company policy—that all of their claims would now be subject 
to individual arbitration and 2) a sort of perverse contractual choose 
your own adventure” game informing employees that they could 
either “confirm their consent” or ask that someone talk to them 
about the agreement. Some choice.  Not wanting to be fired, the 
employees consented. What else were they going to do?23
Take-it-or-leave-it arbitration agreements in employment 
certainly beg the question of whether a true “meeting of the 
minds” has occurred, as contract law would normally require.24
As the Washington Post reported: 
Hours after the decision, one law firm, Ogletree Deakins, 
announced an “automated tool that quickly prepares custom 
arbitration agreements with class action waivers based on 
employers’ requirements and preferences.”25
21. Id. at 1648-49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
22. Id. at 1643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  More than one legal scholar has criticized 
this trend. See Stanford, supra note 6, at 88 (“Despite an absence of preemptive text 
or legislative history, the Court has interpreted the FAA to relieve states of their 
power to require a judicial forum for certain disputes.”) 
23. Sparky Abraham & Oren Nimni, Everyone Needs The Right To Sue Their 
Employer, CURRENT AFFAIRS (May 23, 2018), 
https://www.currentaffairs.org/author/sparkyoren.
24. See, e.g., Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 29 (“There must be mutual assent or a meeting 
of the minds at the same time, on all the essential elements or terms to form a 
binding contract.”) (Footnotes omitted). 
25. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court rules that companies can require workers to accept 
individual arbitration, WASH. POST (May 21, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-rules-that-
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Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning came under attack from 
Garrett Epps, a University of Baltimore law professor, in The 
Atlantic:
False dichotomy, meretricious piety, and pay-no-attention-to-
that-man-behind-the-curtain misdirection are vital arrows in the 
quiver of any lawyer or judge, no matter of what persuasion. These 
tricks were on particularly egregious display in Epic Systems Corp. 
v. Lewis, a 5-4 decision announced Monday in which the Supreme 
Court’s conservative majority continued its drive to narrow 
protection for employee rights.26
He stated: “Employees’ objection to a ‘no group arbitration’ 
clause is that individual arbitration may concern amounts too 
small to make pursuing them worthwhile. Thus, these clauses 
make it easier for employers to maintain unfair or even unlawful 
employment structures and salary systems.”27 As David 
Leonhardt wrote, “[e]ffectively, this means workers often can’t 
sue at all, because individual employees usually don’t have the 
money to hire lawyers and file a claim.”28
The libertarian Cato Institute saw it another way, with 
Walter Olson writing, “Since contracts of this sort typify most of 
the modern economy, the implication, usually not spelled out, is 
that modern consumer and workplace relationships have no 
moral basis in autonomy and should be second-guessed and have 
their terms freely substituted by one or another entity of the 
State.”29
In response to the ruling, a Restaurant News article 
advised: “Restaurant operators should make mandatory 
arbitration agreements with collective-action waivers a standard 
part of their hiring practices, according to attorneys specializing 
in employment cases.”30 It cited “the $5.25 million lawsuit 
companies-can-force-workers-into-individual-arbitration/2018/05/21/09a3a968-5cfa-
11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story.html?utm_term=.853967238140. 




28. David Leonhardt, The Supreme Court v. Your Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/opinion/supreme-court-arbitration.html. 
29. Walter Olson, Epic Systems v. Lewis: It’s OK To Calm Down About Arbitration,
CATO INST. (May 22, 2018), https://www.cato.org/blog/apocalypse-not-arbitration-
survives-epic-systems-v-lewis. 
30. Mark Hamstra, Should You Require Employees to Sign an Arbitration 
Agreement?, NATION’S RESTAURANT NEWS (June 5, 2018), 
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settled in 2012 by celebrity chef Mario Batali and his business 
partners.”31
III. FEDERAL AND STATE RESPONSES TO ARBITRAL 
OVERREACH
It seems questionable that in this hyper-partisan era 
Congress can address the most objectionable implications of 
Epic, although “[i]n the wake of the oral argument in Epic, Sen. 
Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut introduced the Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2018 to prohibit enforcement of pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements in employment as well as in civil rights, 
consumer, and antitrust disputes.”32 Bipartisan legislation has 
https://www.nrn.com/workforce/should-you-require-employees-sign-arbitration-
agreement. 
31. Id.  Is it really objectionable that workers could collectively join together and 
recover for the alleged theft of their tips?  To quote a 2012 article: 
The lawsuit against Mr. Batali, filed in 2010, 
said that he and a partner, Joseph Bastianich, 
and their restaurants had a policy of 
deducting an amount equivalent to 4 to 5 
percent of total wine sales at the end of each 
night from the tip pool and keeping the 
money. 
Benjamin Weiser, Mario Batali Agrees to $5.25 Million Settlement Over Employee 
Tips, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2012), 
https://dinersjournal.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/mario-batali-agrees-to-5-25-
million-settlement-over-employee-tips/. This was hardly a frivolous case.  And Batali 
has other challenges now that arbitration may not preempt. See, e.g., Sandra 
Gonzalez, Mario Batali sued by woman who claims he groped her, CNN (Aug. 24, 
2018) https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/24/entertainment/mario-batali-sexual-assault-
lawsuit/index.html. (“The suit comes several months after Batali first faced 
allegations of sexual misconduct.”). 
32. Craig Becker, Supreme Court Won’t Have the Last Word on Worker Rights, CNN 
(June 27, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/27/opinions/supreme-court-deals-blow-
to-unions-becker/index.html. In the U.S. House, Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D., Wash.) 
has introduced a similar bill, and stated:  
I actually believe that forced arbitration of all 
kinds is something that needs to be looked at 
and potentially removed—but in this bill we 
specifically say that sexual harassment 
should not be included in any forced 
arbitration agreement, and that employees 
who come to an employer should always be 
able to have the choice of bringing their 
complaint around discrimination, assault, or 
harassment either to an arbitrator, or to take 
action against the employer in court. 
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also been introduced to address the especially-outrageous fact 
that sexual harassment claims can be forced into arbitration.33 A 
sponsor, New York Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand, a Democrat like 
Blumenthal, has “pointed out that employers paying out 
settlements are not ‘solving the problem’ and that companies 
with predators in place won’t ‘attract the best and the brightest,’ 
adding, that it ‘stifles growth.’”34  Her Republican co-sponsor, 
South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham, joined her at a press 
event in unveiling the bill, and issued a press release that 
stated: 
Today, an estimated 60 million Americans are subject to forced 
arbitration clauses in their employment contracts. The bipartisan 
legislation would void forced arbitration agreements that require 
arbitration of sexual harassment and discrimination claims and 
allow survivors of sexual harassment or discrimination to seek 
justice, discuss their cases publicly, and eliminate institutional 
protection for harassers.35
Leah Fessler, You’ve probably signed away your sexual harassment civil rights at 
work, QZ.COM (Apr. 5, 2018), https://qz.com/work/1244779/congresswoman-pramila-
jayapal-on-how-mandatory-arbitration-hurts-sexual-harassment-victims/. 
33. Fessler, supra note 32.  
34. Adina Genn, Gillibrand: End Forced Arbitration in Sexual Harassment Cases,
LONG ISLAND BUS. NEWS (Jan. 26, 2018), https://libn.com/2018/01/26/gillibrand-end-
forced-arbitration-in-sexual-harassment-discrimination-cases/. Every single attorney 
general in the United States and its territories has signed a letter to Congress urging 
them to exclude sexual harassment claims from arbitration: 
While there may be benefits to arbitration 
provisions in other contexts, they do not 
extend to sexual harassment claims. Victims 
of such serious misconduct should not be 
constrained to pursue relief from decision 
makers who are not trained as judges, are not 
qualified to act as courts of law, and are not 
positioned to ensure that such victims are 
accorded both procedural and substantive due 
process. 
Letter from Pamela Jo Bondi, Fla. Atty. Gen., et al. to Paul Ryan, Speaker of the 
House, et al. (Feb. 12, 2018), http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/HFIS-
AVWMYN/%24file/NAAG+letter+to+Congress+Sexual+Harassment+Mandatory+Arb
itration.pdf.  
35. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, Graham, Gillibrand 
Announce Bipartisan Legislation To Help Prevent Sexual Harassment In The 
Workplace (Dec. 6, 2017) (on file Graham Senate Office). Graham is a perhaps an 
unlikely champion of encouraging women to “discuss their cases publicly” – when 
Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh was accused of sexual assault, Graham 
did not wait for his accuser to be able to tell her story before the Senate Judiciary 
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One can hope that the #MeToo movement, culminating in 
the 2018 uproar over the nomination of Judge Brett Kavanaugh 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, might at least move forward in 2019 
legislation to guarantee sexual harassment victims access to 
courts, though partisanship might hold even this legislation 
back.36
At least, some employers in the private sector may do the 
right thing, absent legislation. In November 2018, after 
thousands of workers staged a walkout protesting workplace 
policies, Google announced “it would end its requirement for 
employee sexual-harassment claims to be handled in private 
arbitration[.]”37  Facebook followed suit.38
Absent congressional action, the ability of states to do much 
may be limited.  In Washington, Democratic Governor Jay Inslee 
issued an executive order directing that: 
[t]o the extent permissible under state and federal law, when 
making purchasing and other procurement decisions, all state 
executive and small cabinet agencies shall seek to contract with 
qualified entities and business owners that can demonstrate or 
will certify that their employees are not required to sign, as a 
condition of employment, mandatory individual arbitration 
clauses and class or collective action waivers.39
Committee: “Graham repeatedly expressed doubt about the allegation . . . based on 
the amount of time that has passed since the alleged assault and the lack of 
evidence.” William Cummings, ‘I’m not going to ruin Judge Kavanaugh’s life over 
this’: Sen. Graham doubts Ford’s story, USA TODAY (Sept. 23, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2018/09/23/brett-kavanaugh-
allegation-sen-lindsey-graham-has-doubts-ford/1403189002/. 
36. See, e.g., Phillip Bump, Some Conservatives Have Identified the Real Victims in 
the Kavanaugh Fight: Men, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2018) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/24/some-conservatives-have-
identified-real-victims-kavanaugh-fight-men/?utm_term=.42f43357acfe. (“In a recent 
Pew Research Center poll, no group was less likely than Republican men to say that 
discrimination against women was a barrier to top executive positions or higher 
political office. About 15 percent of Republican men believed that gender 
discrimination was a major reason for low representation of women in either area.”). 
37. Douglas MacMillan, Google to End Forced Arbitration for Sexual-Harassment 
Claims, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-to-end-
forced-arbitration-for-sexual-harassment-claims-1541696868. 
38. See Jena McGregor, Google and Facebook ended forced arbitration for sexual 




39. Wash. Exec. Order 18-03 (June 12, 2018). 
https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/exe_order/18-03%20-
%20Workers%20Rights%20%28tmp%29.pdf.   
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States can certainly do this much. 
California took things a step further in 2018, with what one 
newspaper described as a “#MeToo-driven bill” to ban 
mandatory arbitration in employment contracts.40  Democratic 
Governor Jerry Brown had vetoed such a ban before,41 and he 
vetoed the 2018 bill too.42 However well-intended, such an action 
would surely violate the FAA.43 To quote a majority opinion by 
Justice Kagan, the FAA “preempts any state rule discriminating 
on its face against arbitration. . . . And not only that: The Act 
also displaces any rule that covertly accomplishes the same 
objective by disfavoring contracts that (oh so coincidentally) have 
the defining features of arbitration agreements.”44
For that reason, a New York law enacted in 2018 is likely 
void.45 It purports to ban “any clause or provision in any contract 
which requires as a condition of the enforcement of the contract 
or obtaining remedies under the contract that the parties submit 
to mandatory arbitration to resolve any allegation or claim of an 
unlawful discriminatory practice of sexual harassment.”46
The Disclosing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Act of 
2018 enacted in Maryland seems to be self-defeating in its 
preamble: 
Except as prohibited by federal law, a provision in an 
employment contract, policy, or agreement that waives any 
substantive or procedural right or remedy to a claim that accrues in 
the future of sexual harassment or retaliation for reporting or 
asserting a right or remedy based on sexual harassment is null and 
40. Ethan Baron, Proposed ban on mandatory arbitration moves ahead with 




42. Melanie Mason, Measures to end forced arbitration of sexual harassment claims, 
extend statute of limitations vetoed by Gov. Jerry Brown,  L.A. TIMES (Sept, 30, 2018), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-may-2018-
measures-to-end-forced-arbitration-of-1538341555-htmlstory.html. 
43. Id. (“‘The direction from the Supreme Court since my earlier veto has been clear 
— states must follow the Federal Arbitration Act and the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Act,’ Brown wrote. He called any policy like AB 3080 
‘impermissible.’”). 
44. Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S.Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017). 
45. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7515 (McKinney 2018).   
46. Id. at § 7515(a)(2). 
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void as being against the public policy of the state.47
The problem, of course, is that this is prohibited by federal 
law. 
The greatest act of state defiance occurred in Kentucky in 
September 2018, when the Kentucky Supreme Court enforced a 
state law prohibiting “employers from conditioning employment 
on the employee’s agreement to a contract provision mandating 
arbitration in the event of a dispute between them” and 
concluded that “the statute does not run afoul of the FAA under 
the facts of this case.”48  The court artfully – perhaps too artfully 
– determined that the statute in question was: 
not an anti-arbitration clause provision—it is an anti-
employment discrimination provision. KRS 336.700(2) uniformly 
voids any agreement diminishing an employee’s rights against an 
employer when that agreement had to be signed by the employee on 
penalty of termination or as a predicate to working for that 
employer. As such, we hold that the FAA does not preempt KRS 
336.700(2) because it does not discriminate against arbitration 
agreements but rather the conditioning of employment on an 
employee’s agreement to arbitrate.49
IV. BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU ASK FOR: TWO CAUTIONARY 11TH
CIRCUIT DECISIONS ON ARBITRATION
In Epic, Justice Ginsburg had noted “that individual 
arbitration of employee complaints can give rise to anomalous 
results.”50  However, that cuts both ways, and some evidence 
suggests businesses might want to be careful about what they 
have asked for.  As a legal commentator, Alison Frankel, wrote, 
“The Epic decision tilted the already lopsided balance of power 
between employers and employees even more dramatically in 
companies’ favor. What could possibly go wrong?”51
47. Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-715(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 
48. N. Ky.  Area Dev. Dist. v. Snyder, 570 S.W. 3d 531 (Ky. 2018).  
49. Id. (citing Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 336.700(2) (West 2018), amended 2019). The 
Court has previously struck down an attempt by Kentucky to bypass the FAA. See
Kindred Nursing Centers, 137 S. Ct. 1421. 
50. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1648 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  
51. Alison Frankel, From the 11th Circuit, a cautionary tale for employers imposing 
arbitration on workers, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
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Answering her own question, Frankel looked to an August 
2018 decision from the Eleventh Circuit, and stated: 
Plenty, according to a ruling Wednesday from the 11th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Hernandez v. Acosta, which provides a 
$100,000 warning that individual employee arbitration is not 
necessarily a no-lose proposition for employers. “The idea is that 
employers prefer arbitration because it promises ‘quicker, more 
informal, and often cheaper resolutions for everyone involved,’” the 
11th Circuit wrote, quoting Epic. “But as this case shows, 
arbitration does not always live up to this promise.”52
In that case, the employer, Acosta Tractors, complained: 
“‘Arbitration is meant to be a less costly and efficient substitute 
for litigation. In these cases, arbitration has instead turned into 
an overly-expensive, completely inefficient method of dispute 
resolution.’ Acosta said ‘[t]he arbitrators’ fees alone likely exceed 
the amount in controversy, exclusive of attorneys’ fees.’”53
In effect, the Eleventh Circuit gave Acosta a Pyrrhic victory.  
It noted, “[t]he District Court determined that Acosta’s default in 
the arbitration proceedings also warranted the entry of a default 
judgment against it in federal court. This was error.”54  For that 
reason, the case was remanded.55  But, the court noted: 
On remand, the District Court may well find that Acosta acted 
in bad faith in choosing not to pay its arbitration fees. After all, 
Acosta acknowledges it quit paying after the arbitrator failed to 
consolidate Mr. Hernandez’s case with the other cases brought by
other Acosta employees, and because it thought the arbitrator had 
allowed too much discovery. Acosta also noted that arbitration was 
set to cost more than Mr. Hernandez’s claim was worth. A 
calculated choice to abandon arbitration after getting adverse 
rulings from the arbitrator certainly looks like forum shopping.56
In other words, Acosta was bound to the benefit of its 




53. Hernandez v. Acosta Tractors, Inc., 898 F.3d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir. 2018). 
54. Id. at 1305. 
55. Id. at 1306. 
56. Id.
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the door to these consequences.  Arbitration could be a double-
edged sword – upon unsheathing it, one must live or die by it.  
As Frankel noted: 
After Epic, smart employment lawyers on both sides of the bar 
have been saying quietly that case-by-case wage-and-hour 
arbitration could end up being a more expensive proposition for 
corporate defendants than class actions resolving allegations in one 
swoop – assuming, of course, that employees actually bring 
arbitration claims and find lawyers to prosecute their cases.57
Frankel may prove to be too sanguine. But arbitration is not 
without its risks for employers.  As one employment law 
attorney, Ron Chapman, was quoted stating: 
“Arbitrators will frequently try to ‘split the baby’ and please all 
sides,” he said. “The upside is that all claims have to be arbitrated 
individually, so you avoid the big class actions and the exposure 
that comes with them, but the downside is that you run the risk of 
compromised rewards from the arbitrator.”58
In Risk Management, another attorney writes: 
As for its disadvantages, some experts point out that 
arbitration is often just as expensive and time-consuming as 
litigation. These critics cite the increasing complexity of arbitration 
disputes and the fact that counsel sometimes treats arbitration no 
differently than it does litigation. 
Beyond this, others see the lack of judicial review or 
appellate mechanisms as a disadvantage since it leaves an 
aggrieved party with little recourse in the event of a decision 
with which they disagree.59
This lesson – that arbitration does not always lead to 
business happiness – was built upon by another Eleventh 
Circuit ruling, in September 2018. In JPAY, Inc. v. Kobel,60
“Cynthia Kobel and Shalanda Houston sought to compel 
57. Frankel, supra note 51.   
58. Hamstra, supra note 30.   
59. Peter A. Halprin, Determining the Arbitration Obligation, RISK MGMT. (Apr. 3, 
2017), http://www.rmmagazine.com/2017/04/03/determining-the-arbitration-
obligation/. 
60. JPay, Inc. v. Kobel, 904 F.3d 923 (11th Cir. 2018). 
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arbitration on a class basis with JPay, Inc., a Miami-based 
company that provides fee-for-service amenities in prisons in 
more than thirty states.”61  JPay successfully sought a summary 
judgment compelling Kobel and Houston “to arbitrate only their 
own claims.”62  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 
making clear the stakes: 
In class arbitration, like in a class action, representative 
plaintiffs make their case before the adjudicator on behalf of a host 
of similarly situated plaintiffs who will have the opportunity to 
collect damages if the class wins. Procedures like notice 
requirements and opt-out opportunities protect the interests of 
these absent class members, but, nonetheless, allowing a class 
proceeding means determining the rights of many parties who are 
not actively involved, not represented by their own counsel, and, in 
all likelihood, not paying attention. Class availability opens a 
“gateway” to the arbitration proceedings, through which thousands 
of these absent class members might pass if a class is available.63
In contrast, where “a class is not available, the 
representative plaintiffs, here, Kobel and Houston, will argue 
only for themselves.”64  As the court noted: 
Many, if not most, putative class proceedings, are for relatively 
small-dollar claims. If claimants must act on an individual basis, 
the cost of arbitrating any single claim would certainly outweigh 
their expected recovery. No single bilateral arbitration would be 
rational. Only by joining together as a class do they make 
arbitration efficient.65
The court found: 
a clear and unmistakable intent to delegate questions of 
arbitrability to the arbitrator throughout the arbitration provision 
in JPay’s Terms of Service. First, it references AAA rules three 
times . . . Second, and quite independently, the parties expressly 
agreed that “[t]he ability to arbitrate the dispute, claim or 
controversy shall likewise be determined in the arbitration.” 
61. Id. at 926. 
62. Id.
63. Id. at 931-932. 
64. Id. at 932. 
65. Id.
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Finally, the agreement is written in unmistakably broad terms, as 
the parties agreed “to arbitrate any and all such disputes, claims 
and controversies.”66
Sitting by designation, retired Judge James Graham, a 
district court judge from the Southern District of Ohio, 
disagreed: “I believe that a general delegation to arbitrate issues 
of arbitrability is not enough and that without a specific 
reference to class arbitration the court should presume that the 
parties did not intend to delegate to an arbitrator an issue of 
such great consequence.”67
As Vox had reported: 
If you ask employers why they require workers to use 
arbitration, they often say it’s a faster and less expensive process 
than the courts. They’re not wrong. But legal research, surveys, and 
employment attorneys point to the largest incentive of all: keeping 
employment claims from reaching a jury. Juries are considered 
more sympathetic to workers’ claims, and more willing to award 
millions of dollars in damages to workers in these cases. The threat 
of a high jury award also gives workers leverage in negotiating 
larger settlements because businesses want to avoid trial.68
Even prior to Epic, Professor Jean Sterlight had written, 
“[t]oday employers, with substantial assistance from the 
Supreme Court, are using mandatory arbitration clauses to 
‘disarm’ employees, effectively preventing them from bringing 
most individual or class claims and thereby obtaining access to 
justice.”69
66. Id. at 936 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
67. Id. at 944 (Graham, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
68. Campbel & Chang, supra note 1. 
69. Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using 
Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV.
1309, 1310 (2015) (footnote omitted).  Professor Cynthia Estlund raises an 
interesting point, however:  
Judith Resnik and others have shown that the 
presumed contrast to litigation was in some 
ways overstated as litigation itself has 
dramatically receded from the public stage. 
Public trials in civil cases have become nearly 
extinct, as the overwhelming majority of cases 
are resolved either on dispositive motions 
(usually in unpublished opinions) or out-of-
court settlements. Settlements between 
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Yet the Eleventh Circuit decisions make one wonder: will 
businesses complaining of runaway juries someday have 
occasion to complain of runaway arbitrators?70
private parties often include non-disclosure 
provisions barring parties from discussing 
anything about the case or its resolution. 
Estlund, supra note 9, at 679-80. She states: “While it is important not to overstate 
the contrast between arbitration and litigation, there is no doubt that much more of 
the arbitral process is shielded from public view.”  Id. at 680.  
70. In one piece, a law firm warns of 
the “runaway arbitrator,” guided only by a 
sense of fairness, who makes a massive award 
against the party he or she believes is in the 
wrong. Unlike a jury verdict, an excessive 
arbitral award is nearly impossible to 
overturn on appeal. Because of its 
unpredictable and unreviewable nature, 
arbitration may sometimes be a more risky 
choice than litigation. 
Mike Gaddis et al., Arbitration Risks: Why Arbitration is Not Necessarily Better, 
Faster, or Cheaper Than Litigation, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 30, 2016), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d09fdf94-5789-47bf-b728-
c6316a7c35da. This article notes that “[a]rbitrated cases are rarely resolved by 
dispositive motions, and are less likely to reach early settlement than litigated 
cases.  In contrast to many judges, who want to clear their busy dockets as quickly as 
possible, arbitrators are often paid by the hour.” Id. Though, as Professor Sternlight 
maintains, “Even assuming for the sake of argument that employees did quite well in 
arbitration (which is not the case), mandatory arbitration would still be quite 
harmful if it prevented large numbers of employees from filing claims at all.”  
Sternlight, supra note 69, at 1322.  As Professor Estlund states: 
It now appears that the great bulk of disputes 
that are subject to mandatory arbitration 
agreements (“MAAs”)—that is, a large share 
of all legal disputes between individuals 
(consumers and employees) and 
corporations—simply evaporate before they 
are even filed. It is one thing to know that 
mandatory arbitration draws a thick veil of 
secrecy over cases that are subject to that 
process. It is quite another to find that almost 
nothing lies behind that veil. Mandatory 
arbitration is less of an “alternative dispute 
resolution” mechanism than it is a magician’s 
disappearing trick or a mirage.  
Estlund, supra note 9, at 682.  
276 BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20.2 
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Congress should enact legislation to exclude 
employment law violations from mandatory arbitration, 
although, despite the topical primacy of the #MeToo movement, 
this exclusion should not be confined to sexual harassment 
claims alone.71 As noted earlier, there would seem to be no policy 
reason to distinguish the insidiousness of sexual harassment 
from racial discrimination or wage theft.  Indeed, one can easily 
imagine the existence of all three claims for a single claimant.  
Although states are limited in directly taking on Epic due to the 
FAA’s preemption clause, an approach taken in the state of 
Washington would seem to pass muster, and could be replicated 
elsewhere. 
Under this Washington law, enacted in 2018 and 
characterized as “encouraging the disclosure and discussion of 
sexual harassment and sexual assault in the workplace”: 
[A]n employer may not require an employee, as a condition of 
employment, to sign a nondisclosure agreement, waiver, or other 
document that prevents the employee from disclosing sexual 
harassment or sexual assault occurring in the workplace, at work-
related events coordinated by or through the employer, or between 
employees, or between an employer and an employee, off the 
employment premises.72
Note that this does not purport to speak to procedural 
rights, such as the ability to use arbitration agreements.  
71. This would not be a cure-all.  One commentator notes that even if: 
companies stop using forced arbitration, their 
workers will still have plenty of reasons not to 
speak up: fear of retaliation (even though it’s 
illegal), fear of being blacklisted, difficulty 
finding a lawyer to take the case. And with 
President Trump remaking the judiciary in 
his image, federal court may soon not be such 
a great option, either. But at the very least, 
working people should have the chance to 
have their day, together, in court. 
Terri Gerstein, End Forced Arbitration for Sexual Harassment. Then Do More., N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/opinion/arbitration-
google-facebook-employment.html. 
72. 2018 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 117 §1(1) (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, in California in 2018, “outgoing Gov. Jerry Brown 
signed into law a bill that would ban nondisclosure provisions in 
settlements involving claims of sexual assault, harassment or 
discrimination based on sex.”73  The Supreme Court would be 
hard-pressed to claim that the FAA can preempt even the 
disclosure of sexual harassment or assault – disclosure that 
authorities can then act upon, as they are not parties to the 
contract.74  To this approach I would add other employment law 
violations. 
73. Stacy Perman, #MeToo law restricts use of nondisclosure agreements in sexual 
misconduct cases,  L.A. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2018), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-nda-hollywood-20181231-
story.html. Maryland’s Disclosing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Act of 2018, 
in a component that does not purport to ban arbitration, also requires that employers 
of 50 or more employees report to the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights sexual 
harassment settlements (on its own terms this does not apply to either arbitral 
awards or arbitrations that do not result in award).  See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. &
EMPL. § 3-715(2)(a)(3) (West 2018).  
74. Surely the conservative justices must subscribe to the words of the Good Book: 
“And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.”  John 8:32 (King 
James).  Two of the justices – Kavanaugh and Clarence Thomas –have faced serious 
allegations of sexual misconduct, with those involving Thomas featuring a past work 
subordinate.  See, e.g., Ron Elving, Anita Hill’s Challenge To Clarence Thomas: A 
Tale Of 2 Lives And 3 Elections, NPR (Sept. 20, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/09/20/649721806/anita-hills-challenge-to-clarence-thomas-
a-tale-of-2-lives-and-3-elections. 
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